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ABSTRACT 
The response of the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) to the global 
financial crisis has earned high marks for its effectiveness.1 Using its huge foreign 
currency reserves and being relatively unsaddled by debt, China has been able to 
inject massive amounts of capital into its economy to stimulate growth and 
productivity.2 Not only has China responded in a timely and swift manner, but 
China’s response was designed to address some structural imbalances in China’s 
economy, which had been, in the views of some experts, too dependent on exports 
and the influx of foreign direct investment (FDI).3 China’s three-part stimulus 
package, further discussed below,4 was designed to stimulate domestic consumption 
as a driver of growth and to wean China away from an economic growth model that 
was primarily dependent on exports and FDI.5 A more balanced economic model 
might rely on both trade and domestic consumption, and provide a more stable 
growth model for the future.6 As a result, if China can successfully implement its 
economic reform package, China may emerge from the global financial crisis in a 
stronger economic position than that which existed prior to the events that 
precipitated the crisis.  
However, China’s economic reform package may escalate existing trade tensions 
with the United States and may even lead to the imposition of trade sanctions by the 
United States. China’s currency policy and stimulus package involve what some 
                                                          
 1 See China’s Role in the Origins of and Response to the Global Recession: Hearing 
Before the U.S.-China Econ. and Sec. Rev. Comm’n, 111th Cong. 5 (2009) (statement of 
Nicholas R. Lardy, Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics) (“China is 
the gold standard in terms of its response to the global economic crisis.”) [hereinafter Lardy, 
Hearing].  
 2 For further discussion on the stimulus package, see infra Part II.B.1.  
 3 For further discussion on China’s dependency on exports and foreign direct investment, 
see infra Part II.B. For a detailed discussion of foreign direct investment and its role in 
international business, see DANIEL CHOW & THOMAS SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
TRANSACTIONS: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 365–72 (2d ed., 2010) [hereinafter CHOW 
& SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS]. 
 4 For further discussion on China’s three-part stimulus package, see infra Part II.B.1-
II.B.3. 
 5 An economic model dependent on exports and FDI might not be sustainable for the long 
term and is especially susceptible to the actions and economic fortunes of the foreign nations 
that trade with China. For this reason, China has adopted policies to wean its economy away 
from export and FDI dependence. These policies have been in place for some time, preceding 
the global financial crisis. See C. FRED BERGSTEN ET AL., CHINA: THE BALANCE SHEET 26 
(Public Affairs 2006). 
 6 See Fixing Global Finance: An Interview with Martin Wolf, YALEGLOBAL, Mar. 5, 
2009, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/fixing-global-finance-interview-martin-wolf (“In the 
long-run, however, it is right for the Chinese to try and absorb more of their production at 
home and rebalance their economy with more service production which would generate 
actually many more jobs. They have not done a good job of generating jobs recently, because 
their development path has been quite capital-intensive, much too much dependent on 
investment.”); see also Edward Wong, China’s Export Economy Begins Turning Inward, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 25, 2010, at A6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/25/world/asia/ 
25china.html. 
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opponents in the United States view as illegal subsidies to domestic PRC industries 
that produce goods for export to the United States; these critics contend that the 
United States should impose countervailing duties on these goods to offset the 
subsidy.7 In addition, the United States has been consistently calling for China to 
further allow its currency to float under market conditions rather than to remain 
pegged to the U.S. dollar within a narrow range.8 Allowing its currency to 
appreciate, however, will increase the price of China’s exports and may result in a 
decrease in exports at a time when China seeks to increase exports as part of its 
recovery from the global financial crisis. These pressures on China to allow its 
currency to appreciate as it recovers from the global financial crisis will create 
additional trade tensions between the United States and China. Adding to the 
tensions is a perception by many in China that the United States triggered the global 
financial crisis by creating the subprime mortgage problem that led to the financial 
downfall. From China’s perspective, the United States caused the global financial 
crisis and is now threatening to prevent China from taking the necessary steps to 
recover from the crisis. This perception could escalate tensions in United States-
China economic relations.  
The consequences of the global financial crisis for United States-China economic 
relations are still unfolding, and it is still unclear whether trade tensions will escalate 
into trade sanctions. What seems clear, however, is that there is a rising tide of 
protectionism in both countries based upon what hardliners on each side perceive to 
be unfair practices and policies implemented by the other. Historically, mutual 
policies of protectionism between trading partners leads to trade sanctions, which 
would be an unfortunate result for United States-China economic relations. It 
remains to be seen whether hardliners in both countries will push the two trading 
partners into an escalating trade war or whether more moderate voices in the two 
countries can help to address existing trade issues without resorting to a trade war.  
This article discusses the potential for an escalation in trade tensions between the 
two countries as a result of measures taken by China in response to the global 
financial crisis. This article proceeds in three parts. The first part examines the 
effects of the global financial crisis on China. The second part examines China’s 
response to the global crisis. The final part of this article examines the position of the 
United States that China’s policies (some of which predated the global financial 
crisis) and its current economic stimulus package may, in the view of the United 
States, contain unfair trade practices that justify the imposition of trade sanctions. 
I.  THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS AND ITS EFFECT ON CHINA 
To understand the impact of the global financial crisis on China, it is first 
necessary to understand the general features of China’s economy and the current 
trade and economic issues between the United States and China. The discussion 
below analyzes key components of China’s economy, beginning with the economic 
                                                          
 7 For discussion on subsidies and countervailing duties, see infra Part III.A.2. For a 
detailed discussion of these terms and the national and international disciplines governing the 
use of countervailing duties, see DANIEL CHOW & THOMAS SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE LAW: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 710–60 (2008) [hereinafter CHOW & 
SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW].  
 8 For further discussion on China’s currency policies, see infra Part I.A.2(b). 
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reforms that were implemented in 1978 to open China’s economy to trade with other 
nations.9 
A.  China’s Export Driven Economy 
1.  Exports as a Percentage of GDP 
China’s open door policies came into effect starting in 1985. Since then, there 
has been acceleration in the following two decades during which China transformed 
its once static economy into one that is now export driven and dependent on foreign 
direct investment.10 In other words, China’s unprecedented economic growth has 
been driven by the sale of exports to foreign countries and by the massive influx of 
foreign capital by foreign investors (mainly multinational companies) who seek to 
use China as a platform for the manufacture of goods for sale in China and in foreign 
markets. 
In 2007, China became the world’s second largest exporter of merchandise, 
surpassing the United States and second only to Germany.11 China’s net exports 
contributed to one third of its GDP growth in 2007.12 Exports as a share of GDP rose 
from 9.1 percent in 1985 to 37.8 percent in 2008.  
 
FIGURE 1 
CHINA’S EXPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES AS A PERCENTAGE OF  
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT: 1985–2008. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 9 For a concise and general overview of key aspects of China’s economy and implications 
for the United States, see generally BERGSTEN, supra note 5. 
 10 See infra Part I.A.3 fig.1 at p. 12. 
 11 See John W. Miller & Marcus Walker, China Dethrones Germany as Top Goods 
Exporter, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 2010, at A6, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1262 
72143898416853.html. 
 12 See The Spend is Nigh, THE ECONOMIST, July 30, 2009, available at www.economist. 
com/node/14124376?story_id=14124376. 
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As the figure above illustrates, in 2008, exports accounted for 37.8 percent of 
China’s GDP. In contrast to China, exports in the United States accounted for 12.7 
percent of its GDP in that same year.13 China’s export-driven economy indicates that 
China is heavily dependent on consumption of its goods by export markets for its 
economic growth. In addition, China’s export industries serve the crucial function of 
providing employment for China’s constantly growing population. Any contractions 
in China’s export sector would result in a slowing down of China’s economy and 
have painful consequences for the country. 
2.  China’s Trade Balance with the United States 
China’s swift rise as an exporting power has led to an imbalance in the trade of 
goods with the United States. In recent years, the Unites States has maintained a 
huge and increasing trade deficit in goods with China.14 As Table 1 indicates, the 
United States had a trade surplus with China of $2.7 billion in 1980. In 1985, the 
trade balance was zero; since then, the United States has run a trade deficit in every 
year, with the trade deficit reaching a staggering sum of $266 billion in 2008. This is 
an increase of more than twenty-fold since 1990. The United States has not 
maintained a trade surplus with China for three decades. From 2006 to 2007, the 
trade deficit increased by over $40 billion. Given the growth of the trade deficit and 
current trends, it appears that the United States will continue to maintain a large 
trade deficit with China for the foreseeable future. 
                                                          
 13 JOHN TSCHETTER, EXPORTS SUPPORT AMERICAN JOBS, in U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 
INT’L TRADE ADMIN., at 1 (International Trade Research, Report No. 1, 2009), available at 
http://trade.gov/publications/pdfs/exports-support-american-jobs.pdf. 
 14 A trade deficit exists when a nation has a current account deficit, i.e., when a nation 
imports more goods than it exports. For example, if Country A imports more goods from 
Country B than Country A exports to Country B, Country A has a trade deficit in goods with 
Country B while Country B has a trade surplus with Country A. A trade deficit is often 
viewed negatively by countries because it means that the country with the trade deficit is 
buying more goods than it is selling to its trading partner. Some countries view this as unfair. 
Most countries would rather have a trade surplus than a trade deficit. See CHOW & 
SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 7, at 42–43. 
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TABLE 1 
UNITED STATES MERCHANDISE TRADE WITH CHINA: 1980-2009 
 
 
FIGURE 2 
UNITED STATES TRADE BALANCES WITH CHINA: 2000-2008 
 
 
2010] CHINA’S RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 53 
 
 
 
Not only does the United States maintain a growing trade deficit with China but, 
as Table 2 illustrates, China has the largest trade imbalance with the United States 
among its major trading partners. This figure is greater than the U.S. trade deficit 
with the European Union, which has the world’s largest economy and consists of 27 
countries. China now accounts for over one-third of the United States’ trade deficit 
on a global basis.  
 
TABLE 2 
UNITED STATES MERCHANDISE TRADE BALANCES WITH  
MAJOR TRADING PARTNERS: 2008 
 
The United States’ growing and seemingly permanent massive trade deficit with 
China has raised concerns that China may not be playing by the rules of international 
trade by engaging in unfair trade practices that contribute to the growing size of the 
deficit.15 Critics of China do not argue that China should export fewer goods to the 
United States; rather, they argue that China should reciprocate by purchasing more 
imports from the United States in order to correct the trade imbalance.16 Critics often 
                                                          
 15 Many experts dispute the argument that China’s growing trade surplus is primarily due 
to unfair trade practices. Many argue that the growing U.S. trade deficit with China is largely 
the result of the movement of production facilities from other Asian countries to China. 
Products such as computers and electronic goods, once made in Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
and South Korea, are now made in China and then exported to the United States. Statistics 
support the view that manufacturing is shifting from other Asian countries to China—while 
imports of certain products such as computer equipment from China have increased, imports 
of those same products from other Asian countries have decreased. See WAYNE MORRISON & 
MARC LABONTE, CHINA’S CURRENCY: A SUMMARY OF THE ECONOMIC ISSUES 8, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV. REPORT RS21625 (2009) [hereinafter MORRISON & LABONTE]. China has 
become a platform for the assembly and finishing of products that originate in other Asian 
countries. This view paints a far less threatening view of China, but it is one that is not 
popular with the press or the United States government.  
 16 Of course, another method that will reduce the U.S. trade deficit with China is for U.S. 
consumers to purchase fewer Chinese imports and to save and invest more of their funds. If 
U.S. consumers spent less and saved more, the U.S. trade deficit with China and the rest of the 
world would decrease. Spending less and saving more will have many beneficial effects for 
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point to several major Chinese policies that contribute to the U.S. trade deficit with 
China. 
a.  Lack of Reciprocal Spending By China 
In international trade, the basic concept is that in order for all nations to benefit, 
spending must be circular.17 Nations that export goods and maintain a trade surplus 
earn revenue and should use their earnings to purchase goods from their trading 
partners. This type of reciprocal spending would tend to reduce the trade imbalance 
over time. China exports textiles (clothing), shoes, toys, and furniture18 to the United 
States and should, thus, use its earnings to purchase imports from the United States, 
consisting of airplanes, power generators, and pharmaceuticals. Each nation should 
sell goods in its area of comparative advantage19 so that all nations would benefit by 
achieving greater levels of consumption and enjoy a higher standard of living that 
would not be possible without international trade.20 If China purchased more goods 
and services from the United States, the United States’ trade deficit with China 
would tend to decrease over time. However, critics argue that China is not 
reciprocating in its trading relationship with the United States; China is not spending 
its earnings from the sales of exports to the United States to purchase U.S. goods and 
                                                          
the U.S. economy beyond reducing the trade deficit with China. Since the savings rate in the 
United States is zero or negative, the United States is living beyond its means and continuing 
to incur an ever-increasing trade deficit. The United States is funding its spending by 
borrowing from China and other countries. Foreign countries purchase debt instruments 
(government bonds) but also purchase equity investments so that more and more of the U.S. 
economy is now owned by foreign investors. It is unclear how the United States can continue 
to live beyond its means indefinitely, but it appears that most politicians are not willing to 
deliver the message to U.S. consumers that it is necessary to save more and spend less. Most 
politicians and government officials find it more expedient to criticize trading partners than to 
deliver the unpleasant and unwelcome message to the U.S. consumer that it is necessary to 
consume less and save more. 
 17 See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 7, at 44. 
 18 In recent years, China has shifted its composition of exports away from labor intensive, 
low technology goods to high technology goods. In 2009, the largest categories of exports 
from China to the United States were computer equipment, manufactured commodities, and 
telecommunications equipment; apparel was sixth. See U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, U.S. Imports 
for Consumption at Customs Value from China: Fiscal Year 2009 (Aug. 31, 2010), 
http://dataweb.usitc.gov/scripts/cy_m3_run.asp?Fl=m&Phase=HTS2&cc=5700&cn=China; 
see also MORRISON & LABONTE, supra note 15, at 6. 
 19 The concept of comparative advantage is that due to certain factor endowments (such as 
arable land and water and mineral resources), differences in climate, education and culture, 
certain countries may have inherent efficiencies in some industries over others. For example, 
Country A may be much more efficient in producing automobiles than shoes while Country B 
might be more efficient in producing shoes than automobiles. Rather than both countries 
producing automobiles and shoes, each country should concentrate on the area of its greatest 
strength and efficiency, and then trade with the other country for goods that it does not 
produce. By trading, both counties will be able to enjoy increased consumption of automobiles 
and shoes and obtain a higher standard of living than what would be possible without 
international trade. See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 7, at 
32–33.  
 20 See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 7, at 33–36. 
2010] CHINA’S RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 55 
 
services in return.21 According to its critics, China is “hoarding” its earnings.22 As a 
result, imports from the United States to China have grown at a much slower pace 
than exports from China to the United States.23 
If China is not spending but “hoarding” its earnings, what is China doing with its 
earnings? China is saving its earnings by purchasing U.S. Treasury securities (bonds 
issued by the U.S. government) with its earnings and has now become the largest 
holder of U.S. bonds.  
 
TABLE 3 
CHINA’S HOLDINGS OF U.S. SECURITIES: JUNE 2002-JUNE 2008 
($BILLIONS AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE) 
 
 
TABLE 4 
CHINA’S HOLDINGS OF U.S. TREASURY SECURITIES: 2002-APRIL 2009 
($BILLIONS AND PERCENTAGE AS A TOTAL OF FOREIGN HOLDINGS) 
 
 
As Table 3 indicates, China’s holdings of U.S. securities increased by nearly $1.1 
trillion dollars (or by 566%) from 2002 to 2008, the largest increase of holdings by 
                                                          
 21 See Martin Crutsinger, Trade Gap Widens as Imports and Exports Both Rise, ABC 
NEWS (July 13, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=11150658; Charles A. 
Kupchan, Op-Ed., Soothing China-U.S. Tensions, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2010, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/31/opinion/31iht-edkupchan.html. 
 22 See Joseph E. Stiglitz, How to Fix the Global Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2006, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/03/opinion/03stiglitz.html?ref=joseph_e_ 
stiglitz. Of course, China has no legal obligation to spend its earnings by purchasing more 
U.S. goods, and China is not violating any laws when it saves and invests its earnings. 
However, critics feels that such a practice, although legal, is not fair because China benefits 
from U.S. purchases of China’s goods, but the United States does not receive an equivalent 
benefit from China; China does not buy sufficient quantities of U.S. goods in return and, 
instead, saves rather than spends its earnings. 
 23 See supra Part I.A.2 tbl.1 at p. 5. 
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far of U.S. securities by any foreign country. These increases are attributable to some 
of China’s currency policies.24 China’s holdings of U.S. Treasury securities rose 
from $118.4 billion in 2002 to $727.4 billion in 2008, an increase of over 600 
percent. China’s holdings of U.S. bonds now comprise 23.6 percent of all of its 
foreign holdings. 
China’s massive holdings of U.S. securities have several important consequences 
for U.S.-China economic relations. When China purchases U.S. government 
securities, China is lending money to the United States and helping the United States 
fund the U.S. federal deficit. Without the infusion of funds from China, the U.S. 
government would need to find other ways to raise revenue or otherwise engage in 
painful budget cuts. The purchase of U.S. Treasury securities by China has allowed 
the U.S. government to forego raising taxes. By not raising taxes, the U.S. 
government is allowing U.S. consumers to have more funds at their disposal. Many 
consumers use these funds to purchase even more cheap Chinese imports, thereby 
adding to the growing trade deficit. The cycle appears to be one that never ends, 
resulting in a continuing U.S. trade deficit that grows with no end in sight.25 A 
second consequence is that many U.S. observers believe that China’s massive 
holdings of U.S. securities might give the country increased leverage over the United 
States on political and economic issues: China could threaten to sell massive 
amounts of U.S. securities, thereby triggering a devaluation of the dollar and 
economic instability in the United States, and then use that as leverage on important 
political issues. Finally, China’s large holdings create a relationship of dependence 
by China on a healthy U.S. economy. China has an incentive to keep buying U.S. 
securities in order to protect its significant investments in the United States.  
b.  Currency Policies 
A second concern raised by critics of China’s trade policies concerns China’s 
currency policies. Under classic international trade theory, trade imbalances tend to 
naturally correct over time.26 When the United States purchases goods from China, 
the United States will exchange U.S. currency for the Chinese yuan or Renminbi 
(RMB or “people’s currency”) in order to pay for the goods. In a free market under 
which the exchange rate is allowed to float—that is, fluctuate in accordance with 
supply and demand—the increasing demand for imports from China will raise the 
demand for RMB so that the RMB will appreciate against the dollar.27 In other 
words, as demand for Chinese imports continues to increase in the United States, the 
demand for RMB should also continue to increase with the result that more U.S. 
dollars will be necessary to purchase the same number of RMB.28 The appreciation 
of the RMB will mean that Chinese goods will become more expensive to the U.S. 
consumer and, conversely, U.S. goods will become cheaper to the Chinese 
consumer.29 U.S. consumers will need to pay more dollars in order to acquire the 
                                                          
 24 For further discussion on China’s currency policies, see infra Part I.A.2(b). 
 25 See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 7, at 47. 
 26 See id. at 45. 
 27 See id. 
 28 See id. 
 29 See id. 
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same amount of goods from China, whereas Chinese consumers will have to pay 
fewer RMB in order to acquire the same amount of goods from the United States.30 
If China begins to export fewer goods to the United States and import more goods 
from the United States,31 the appreciation of the RMB against the U.S. dollar should 
result in a decrease of the trade imbalance in favor of China and a decrease in the 
U.S. trade deficit with China.32  
The discussion so far assumes that the RMB is a freely traded currency and that 
its exchange rate is allowed to float. Historically, however, China has maintained a 
fixed exchange pegged to the U.S. dollar with very narrow ranges.33 As a result, 
although the high demand for the Chinese currency should result in an appreciation 
of the RMB versus the dollar and a correction in the trade imbalance between the 
two countries, the increased demand has not, until recently, resulted in an 
appreciation of the RMB due to China’s own fiscal policies.34 Critics charge that the 
RMB is undervalued and that the purpose of undervaluing the RMB is to support 
China’s export industries.35 China’s response is that its currency policy is not meant 
to favor exports over imports; rather, it is designed to maintain economic stability 
through currency stability.36 Under current economic conditions, an appreciation of 
the RMB would harm export industries by making exports more expensive, which 
might lead to employment disruptions, worker unrest, and social chaos.37 China also 
believes that its own banking system is too underdeveloped to deal with the 
speculative pressures that would come with a freely convertible currency.38 
Under lobbying and pressure from other countries, China modified its currency 
policy in 2005.39 China announced a new policy that the RMB exchange would be a 
managed float, i.e., allowing the RMB to appreciate within very narrow ranges 
against a basket of currencies that include the U.S. dollar, the Japanese yen, the 
Euro, and a few other currencies.40 Unlike a true floating currency, the RMB would 
be allowed to fluctuate up to .03% (later changed to .05%) on a daily basis.41 
Although the RMB has appreciated from 8.11 to the dollar on July 21, 2005,42 to 
                                                          
 30 See id. 
 31 See CHOW & THOMAS SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 7, at 45. 
 32 See id. 
 33 See id. at 45–46. 
 34 See id. at 46. 
 35 MORRISON & LABONTE, supra note 15, at Summary ¶ 1. 
 36 See id. at 2. 
 37 See id. 
 38 See id. 
 39 See id. at 1. 
 40 See id. 
 41 See MORRISON & LABONTE, supra note 15, at 1. 
 42 See id. See also Luo Yuanjun, China’s Foreign Trade Under a Stronger Yuan, CHINA 
TODAY, Oct. 20, 2005, available at http://www.chinatoday.com.cn/English/e2005/e200510/ 
p26.htm. 
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6.78 as of this writing,43 many critics point to the sharp increase in China’s foreign 
currency reserves (which grew from $400 billion in 2003 to $1.95 trillion in 2008) 
and China’s large and growing trade surplus with the United States ($266 billion in 
2008) as evidence that the RMB is still undervalued by as much as 40%.44 The  
 
FIGURE 3 
CHINA’S ACCUMULATION OF FOREIGN CURRENCY 
RESERVES: 2001-09 ($BILLIONS) 
 
United States is continuing to put pressure on China to allow the RMB to appreciate 
further, resulting in intense trade tensions between the two countries. China claims 
that it wishes to adopt a more flexible currency policy, but at a gradual pace.45 
                                                          
 43 See XE.com, Universal Currency Converter Results, http://www.xe.com/ucc/convert.cgi 
(last visited Nov. 10, 2010), for the current exchange rates. As of this writing, RMB 
appreciated 6.78 to the U.S. dollar. 
 44 Ernest H. Preeg, Exchange Rate Manipulation to Gain an Unfair Competitive 
Advantage: The Case Against Japan and China, in DOLLAR OVERVALUATION AND THE WORLD 
ECONOMY 267-84 (C. Fred Bergsten & John Williamson eds., 2003); see also Roya 
Wolverson, Confronting the China-U.S. Economic Imbalance, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 
RELATIONS, Feb. 17, 2010, available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/20758/confronting_the 
_chinaus_economic_imbalance.html (“U.S. policymakers, businesses, and labor groups have 
argued that the Chinese currency is undervalued by as much as 40 percent against the dollar, 
making Chinese exports--such as steel pipes and tires--to the United States cheaper and 
putting massive dollar flows in the hands of the Chinese.”). 
 45 See MORRISON & LABONTE, supra note 15, at 2. 
2010] CHINA’S RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 59 
 
As Figure 3 illustrates, China’s foreign currency reserves grew from $212 billion 
in 2001 to $1.95 trillion in 2009, an increase of over 900%. China now has the 
largest foreign currency reserves in the world, 46 allowing the country to make global 
investments and loans to further its interests in building ties in Africa and the Middle 
East, and to meet its energy needs. Critics point to China’s massive foreign currency 
reserves, accumulated in just eight years, as another indication of China’s unfair 
trade practices based on currency manipulation. 
c.  Export Subsidies 
A third cause often cited by critics of China’s trade policies is that China’s 
exports benefit from subsidies provided by the PRC government.47 A subsidy can be 
in the form of a direct financial payment or in the form of an abatement of charges 
(such as taxes) that would be otherwise due from the business entity.48 A subsidy can 
also take the form of favorable business arrangements such as reduced rent for 
facilities and reduced prices for utilities and other inputs.49 Many critics charge that 
China provides subsidies to many of its own state-owned enterprises that are then 
allowed to charge lower prices for its exports to the United States and, thereby, 
obtain a competitive advantage over other goods that do not benefit from the 
subsidy.50 Under a recent United States Department of Commerce ruling, non-market 
economies, like China, are subject to countervailing duties, i.e., a duty or tax 
imposed by the United States Customs and Border Patrol, upon an import at the 
border to offset the trade-distorting effect of the government-provided subsidy.51 
                                                          
 46 See Li Yanping & Zhang Dingmin, China’s Foreign Reserves Rise at Slowest Pace 
Since 1999 in Second Quarter, BLOOMBERG, July 11, 2010, available at http://www. 
bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-11/china-june-money-supply-lending-growth-slow-on-
government-curbs-on-credit.html. 
 47 In international trade, a subsidy is defined as a financial contribution by a government 
to a business or firm. See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement 
art. 1, Apr. 15,1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 229, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-
scm.pdf. See also U.S. Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(A) (2009) (defining 
countervailable subsidy). See also CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra 
note 7, at 712. 
 48 See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 7, at 717. 
 49 See id.  
 50 See An Assessment of China’s Subsidies to Strategic and Heavyweight Industries, U.S.-
CHINA ECON. AND SEC. REV. COMM’N (Cap. Trade Inc., Washington, D.C.), at 131. 
 51 The imposition of countervailing duties on imports from China marks a departure from 
a long held position established by Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308 
(Fed. Cir. 1986), which held that countervailing duties could not be imposed on products from 
non-market economies that are not governed by the rules of supply and demand in a free 
market. In determining whether a subsidy exists, the basic comparison is between the actions 
of the government against a market-based benchmark. Is the government providing the firm 
with a benefit that is above and beyond what is available in the market? However, if there is 
no meaningful market-place benchmark in the foreign country (as in the case of non-market 
economies), it becomes impossible to make this comparison. For this reason, the United States 
refused to apply countervailing duties to non-market economies, such as China. However, on 
March 30, 2007, the U.S. Department of Commerce reversed this longstanding policy by 
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3.  Foreign Direct Investment 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) refers to the injection of capital into China by 
foreign investors (mainly multinational corporations).52 An example of FDI occurs 
when a U.S. company establishes a subsidiary in China for the purpose of 
conducting business in China.53 FDI is important to China’s economy for several 
reasons. First, many foreign invested enterprises (FIEs)54 are engaged in exports of 
goods from China, helping China fuel its growing trade surplus with the United 
States.  
Second, FDI plays a crucial growth in China’s economic development by 
providing a massive influx of capital. In order to establish these business entities, the 
U.S. company will be required by the PRC government to inject capital into China to 
meet the business entities’ physical needs, such as building a factory or office 
                                                          
imposing preliminary countervailing duties on imports of high gloss paper from China. See 
Tim Truman, Commerce Department Targets Chinese Subsidies on Coated Free-Sheet Paper, 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE UPDATE (Int’l Trade Ass’n, Washington, D.C.), Apr. 2007, at 1. The 
United States cited reforms in China’s economy as evidence that a meaningful market-place 
benchmark is now available for the purpose of determining whether the government is 
providing countervailable subsidies. China has challenged this ruling both in U.S. courts and 
before the WTO. See Steven R. Weisman, China Wins Trade Ruling About Paper, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 21, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/21/business/world 
business/21trade.html; Jeanette Clinkunbroomer, Tariffs on Imported Paper May Be Back, 
PRINTING NEWS, Nov. 17, 2009, available at http://www.printingnews.com/print/Printing-
News/Tariffs-on-Imported-Paper-May-Be-Back/3$11457; Jeanette Clinkunbroomer, Paper 
Outlook 2010: Running in Place, PRINTING NEWS, Apr. 21, 2010, available at 
http://www.printingnews.com/publication/article.jsp?pubId=3&id=12268&pageNum=3. 
Some observers consider this policy change to be an example of the rising tide of protectionist 
sentiment against China in the United States. Proposed legislation in Congress (i.e., H.R. 496) 
would ensure that the U.S. Commerce Department continues to apply countervailing duties to 
goods from non-market countries, such as China. See WAYNE MORRISON, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., RL 33536, CHINA-U.S. TRADE ISSUES 24 (2009) [hereinafter MORRISON, TRADE ISSUES]; 
see also U.S. Paper Companies Commend Tariff Decision, BUS. J. MILWAUKEE, Apr. 30, 
2010, available at http://milwaukee.bizjournals.com/milwaukee/stories/2010/04/26/daily. 
html. 
 52 A more formal definition of FDI is as follows: foreign direct investment (FDI) refers to 
the influx of capital supplied by foreign investors for the purpose of acquiring a lasting 
ownership interest in a business entity located in a foreign country. A good example would be 
when a U.S. parent company establishes a wholly or partially subsidiary in a foreign country. 
The subsidiary is a creature of the domestic law of the foreign nation host but the owner of the 
subsidiary is a U.S. company. See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
TRANSACTIONS, supra note 3, at 366. 
 53 The business entity could take the form of a joint venture with a local partner or a 
wholly foreign owned enterprise in which the foreign investor is the sole owner. Both cases 
involve FDI because the foreign investor injects capital into the business entity and obtains a 
lasting or permanent interest in the business entity, which itself is a creature of Chinese law.  
 54 A foreign invested enterprise is the technical name under PRC law of the business entity 
established by China by the multinational company. The business entity is a creation of PRC 
law, but it is owned in part or in its entirety by a foreign investor. 
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buildings and purchasing equipment and supplies.55 Further, the newly established 
business entity will need to hire local workers, providing employment opportunities 
for new graduates of China’s universities.  
Third, FDI also provides the crucial component of technology transfer. In most 
cases, the foreign investor will need to transfer or license its technology to the 
business entity in China in order for the business to operate successfully.56 For 
example, in the case of a U.S. pharmaceutical company with a joint venture in 
China, the U.S. company will need to license its patents to the joint venture so that 
the joint venture can manufacture the patented drugs.57 Without access to the patents, 
the Chinese joint venture will be unable to manufacture the products. In most cases, 
the technology component is the most valuable business asset of the U.S. company. 
Where the U.S. company is providing technology, the technology can be valued and 
treated as part of the capital contribution of the U.S. company in China. The role of 
FDI is crucial to China because FDI provides capital, thereby resulting in new 
construction projects and, more importantly, providing China with the access to 
advanced technology that is crucial to competitiveness in the modern world.  
 
                                                          
 55 All foreign invested enterprises must be approved by the appropriate approval 
authorities. Depending on the size of the investment, the approval authority will be the 
Ministry of Commerce at the central level and its provincial and local branches. As part of the 
approval process, the approval authority will carefully scrutinize the financial needs of the 
proposed foreign invested enterprise and will require that enough capital be injected by the 
foreign investor to establish a sustainable and operational business. The approval authorities 
will often scrutinize the documents submitted by the foreign investor carefully, line-by-line, 
and require detailed, minute changes. See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
TRANSACTIONS, supra note 3, at 492. For various historical and political reasons, FDI is not 
subject to the discipline of the World Trade Organization. See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 7, at 323–24. 
 56 In this context, technology refers to knowledge or information that is often protected by 
intellectual property rights. See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
TRANSACTIONS, supra note 3, at 324. 
 57 The U.S. company will first register the patents in China under its own name. This is a 
crucial step because it establishes that the U.S. company is the owner of the intellectual 
property. The U.S. company will then license the patents to the joint venture or the wholly 
foreign owned enterprise. The joint venture or wholly owned enterprise becomes the licensee 
of the technology whereas the U.S. company is the owner/licensor. This is typically what is 
referred to as technology transfer—that is, the owner of technology gives access to the 
technology to a third party. 
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TABLE 5 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CHINA, INFLOWS 
($BILLIONS) 
 
 
Source: World Bank Indicators 
 
In 2008, FDI inflows to China totaled $148 billion, making China the largest FDI 
recipient among developing countries and the third largest recipient of FDI overall in 
the world.58 FDI has been a major factor in China’s productivity gains and economic 
growth. Most of the world’s largest multinational corporations, such as General 
Motors, Procter & Gamble, and Coca-Cola, have substantial investments in China.59 
The PRC government estimates that, as of 2007, there were 286,200 approved FIEs 
in China and that these FIEs employed more than 42 million people and accounted 
for 31.5% of gross industrial output.60 Annual FDI in China grew from $2 billion in 
1985 to $148 billion in 2008. The total cumulative level of FDI in China at the end 
of 2008 is estimated to be about $880 billion.61 Thus, FDI has played a crucial role in 
China’s modernization and industrialization. 
4.  Summary 
As the preceding discussion indicates, China’s economic growth has been 
heavily dependent on exports and FDI. Unlike the United States, domestic 
                                                          
 58 China’s FDI only trails behind the EU, the largest overall recipient, followed by the 
United States in second place. See WAYNE MORRISON, CHINA AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
CRISIS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES, CONG. RES. SERV. REP. RS22984, at 1 (2009) 
[hereinafter MORRISON, GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS]. 
 59 See DANIEL CHOW, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN A 
NUTSHELL 35 (2d ed. 2009) [hereinafter CHOW, NUTSHELL]. 
 60 See WAYNE MORRISON, CHINA’S ECONOMIC CONDITIONS, CONG. RES. SERV. REP. 
RL33534, at 9 (2009) [hereinafter MORRISON, ECONOMIC CONDITIONS]. 
 61 See Penelope B. Prime, China and India Enter Global Markets: A Review of 
Comparative Economic Development and Future Prospects, 50 EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY & 
ECON. 621, 630 (2009). 
2010] CHINA’S RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 63 
 
consumption in China is not a major driver of economic growth. An economic model 
like China’s is heavily dependent on its trading relationships with foreign countries 
for its continued growth. As the next section indicates, such trading relationships 
have come under severe pressure as a result of the global financial crisis. 
5.  Impact of Financial Crisis 
China’s exposure to the global financial crisis is moderated by its lack of direct 
exposure to the subprime mortgage problem. China places numerous restrictions on 
capital flows, particularly outflows of capital to foreign destinations.62 These policies 
limit the ability of Chinese citizens to invest abroad, thereby compelling many 
Chinese citizens and private firms to invest their savings domestically in PRC banks, 
the stock market, business ventures, and the real estate market. Many Chinese 
citizens, however, are able to illegally circumvent these restrictions and invest 
abroad. Some of these investments may have been in subprime mortgages, but the 
extent of this investment is unclear and is likely to be relatively small.63  
The PRC government accounts for the bulk of foreign investment overseas, much 
of it derived from China’s massive foreign currency reserves. But the PRC 
government invests mainly in safe low-yielding instruments, such as U.S. Treasury 
securities. As of June 2008, the U.S. Treasury Department estimated that China’s 
holdings of U.S. securities totaled $1.2 trillion, up from $922 billion in June 2007. 
This makes China the second largest holder of U.S. securities in the world, behind 
Japan.64 Of this total, $527 billion were in long-term U.S. government agency 
securities, $522 billion in U.S. Treasury securities, and the remainder in corporate 
securities and debt.65 PRC authorities do not release detailed information about its 
financial holdings, so it is not possible to determine with certainty how much of this 
investment was in subprime mortgages and mortgage-backed securities. However, 
PRC officials are cautious and conservative by nature in their investment strategies; 
it would have been unlikely for the officials to invest heavily in securities that might 
have been viewed as speculative, even if such investments were extremely popular 
with investors in the United States. In addition, PRC officials are not likely to invest 
in mortgage-backed securities and other innovative financial instruments that few 
people, including investment experts in China or the United States, seem to fully 
understand. While it is likely that China did have some investments in subprime 
mortgages, this exposure was most likely small and was not, by itself, the cause of 
significant financial losses to China.66 
While China’s direct exposure to subprime mortgages may have been limited, the 
effect of the subprime mortgage problem did affect China because the problem had a 
significant and harmful impact on the economies of China’s two largest trading 
partners: the United States and the EU. The result of the economic downturn in the 
                                                          
 62 See MORRISON, GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS, supra note 58, at 2. 
 63 The PRC government will tolerate some circumvention of laws against foreign 
investment so long as the infractions are minor. The lack of a crackdown on private 
individuals and private firms investing overseas in subprime mortgages suggests that the 
amount of this illegal activity was insignificant. 
 64 See MORRISON, GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS, supra note 58, at 2–3. 
 65 See id. at 3. 
 66 See Lardy, Hearing, supra note 1, at 6–7. 
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United States, the EU, and other countries around the world contributed to a 
significant slowing down of China’s economy. As a result of the global financial 
crisis, China’s largest target export markets have considerably slowed their 
purchases of Chinese exports: consumers in the United States and EU are not 
spending as a result of the financial crisis, and China’s exports have declined 
significantly.67 FDI inflows to China have also decreased sharply as cost cutting 
measures by multi-national companies (MNCs) have resulted in low availability of 
capital for foreign investment. In April 2009, FDI inflows to China were down by 
22.5%, as compared to April 2008 when FDI surged by over 70%.68 
 
FIGURE 4 
CHANGES IN CHINA’S MONTHLY TRADE AND FDI INFLOWS: APRIL 2008-APRIL 
2009 
 
 
The declines in merchandise trade, the influx of FDI, and exports have led to 
sharp retractions of China’s economy. For the first four months of 2009, industrial 
output rose by 5.5%, well below the 12.9% growth rate in 2008.69 China’s real GDP 
growth was expected to slow to 6.6% in 2009.70 This might seem like a steady rate of 
growth, but this is an economy that grew at an annual rate of nearly 10% from 1979 
to 2008,71 a three decade period that began with economic reforms and ended up at 
                                                          
 67 China’s exports and imports were down in February 2009 by 25.7 percent and 24.1 
percent respectively. See MORRISON, GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS, supra note 58, at 4. 
 68 See id.  
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 MORRISON, ECONOMIC CONDITIONS, supra note 60, at 4. 
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its present rate. Some believe that China’s economy needs to grow at a rate of at 
least 8% per year because China’s expanding population requires the creation of 20 
million new jobs per year.72 In January 2009, the PRC government estimated that the 
slow down in China’s economy due to the global economic crisis led to the loss of 
20 million jobs in 2008.73 
Another effect of the global financial crisis in China is the slowing down of 
China’s real estate market. In fact, in several of China’s cities, there are signs of a 
bubble that is bursting, including a slowing down in construction and falling prices, 
and increases in uncompleted and unoccupied buildings.74  
An additional indication of the impact of the global financial crisis on the overall 
health of the economy is the sharp decline in the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
Composite Index, China’s main stock market, which lost two-thirds of its value from 
December 31, 2007 to December 31, 2008.75   
Taken together, these effects, especially loss of the ability to create new jobs 
through the growth of the economy and the loss of current jobs due to the global 
economic crisis, could create a serious social problem for China. The popular 
support for the Communist Party of China (CPC) is based on its ability to deliver 
increased economic growth and prosperity for China’s population, the vast majority 
of who are still quite poor by international standards.76 The failure of the CPC’s 
delivery of this part in the implied compact will lead to social unrest and challenges 
to its authority. Already, China has seen, in recent years, a sharp increase in 
incidents of violent protests by disgruntled groups who believe that they are not 
receiving their share of the fruits of China’s economic rise.77 Some of these protests 
                                                          
 72 MORRISON, GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS, supra note 58, at 4; see generally MORRISON, 
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS, supra note 60, at 22–23. 
 73 MORRISON, GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS, supra note 58, at 4. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 In 2009, China’s gross national income per capita was estimated at $3,590. WORLD 
BANK, GROSS NATIONAL INCOME PER CAPITA 2009, ATLAS METHOD AND PPP (2010), 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GNIPC.pdf. In that same 
year, the annual per capita disposable income of urban households was 17,175 yuan, or about 
$2,583, whereas the annual per capita net income of rural households was 5,153 yuan, or 
about $775. NATIONAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF CHINA, STATISTICAL COMMUNIQUÉ OF THE 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON THE 2009 NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT, 
Population, Living Conditions and Social Security, Figs. 14–15 (Feb. 25, 2010), available at 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/newsandcomingevents/t20100226_402623115.htm. See also 
Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review: Report by China, WT/TPR/G/230 (Apr. 26, 
2010), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/g230_e.doc (“China’s per-
capita GDP still ranks behind more than 100 countries. Calculated by the World Bank’s 
poverty standard of 1.25 USD per person per day, China still had some 150 million people 
living in poverty by the end of 2008.”); Olivia Chung, Wen Plugs Concerns over Stimulus 
Exit, ASIA TIMES, Mar. 6, 2010, available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/ 
LC06Cb01.html (“The urban-rural income gap is now at its widest since the country launched 
its reform and opening-up policy in 1978.”). 
 77 See Chris O’Brien, Economy Protests Worry Beijing, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2008, 
available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/nov/28/economy-protests-worry-
beijing/; Wu Zhong, Beijing Hears Dissenting Voice on Unrest, ASIA TIMES, Apr. 28, 2010, 
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predated the current global economic crisis and were directed at the perceived 
inequities generated by China’s unprecedented period of economic expansion, such 
as huge disparities in wealth acquisition. A loss of jobs and the overall decline of the 
economy due to the global financial crisis pose a major threat because it might lead 
to increased social instability that could threaten the ability of the CPC to remain in 
power. 
II.  CHINA’S RESPONSE TO FINANCIAL CRISIS 
Among many groups in China, there is a lot of anger and resentment directed at 
the United States for precipitating the global financial crisis through the subprime 
mortgage problem.78 Many in China find it difficult to believe that U.S. banks and 
the financial industry could create financial products that no one seemed to really 
understand and that these exotic subprime mortgages were packaged as securities 
and other financial products;79 these, in turn, were sold in huge quantities in the 
United States and abroad. As previously discussed, China’s leaders are quite 
conservative in their fiscal policies and, thus, avoided these financial products.80 But 
many people in China, including China’s leaders, are truly puzzled by what they see 
as irresponsible financial behavior. There is also anger because China’s economy is 
heavily dependent on the United States, which is one of the largest target markets for 
China’s exports and one of the largest foreign investors in China.81 Many people in 
China believe that China was lulled into creating close economic ties with the United 
States based on a false belief that the United States economy was stable and 
                                                          
available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/LD28Ad01.html; China Fears Job Riots, 
CNN WORLD NEWS, Nov. 20, 2008, available at http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/ 
11/20/china.jobs/. 
 78 This observation is based upon the author’s own experience. 
 79 Liu Mingkang, Chairman, China Banking Regulatory Comm’n, Address at the British 
Museum (May 6, 2008) (transcript available at Embassy of the People's Republic of China in 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) (“[I]f we look into how the sub-
prime loans are made by American mortgage lenders, how such mortgage loans are then 
packaged and securitized by the investment intermediaries, and how the whole process has 
given rise to huge conflicts of interest[,] I am [not] surprise[d] if we look into how the 
regulators view and respond to such so-called innovations. It is indeed a big mishap for human 
beings to face at the outset of the new millennium.”). See also Edward Wong, Booming, China 
Faults U.S. Policy on the Economy, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2008, available at http://www. 
nytimes.com/2008/06/17/world/asia/17china.html?pagewanted=1. 
 80 China purchased very few of these financial products; see Lardy, Hearing, supra note 1, 
at 6-7. 
 81 See, e.g., Thomas Omestad, Chinese Blame U.S. Policies for Financial Crisis During 
Economic Talks, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Dec. 4, 2008, available at 
http://politics.usnews.com/news/articles/2008/12/04/chinese-blame-us-policies-for-financial-
crisis-during-economic-talks.html; Jiang Yuxia, U.S. Subprime Crisis to Affect China's 
Exports, CHINA VIEW, Mar. 8, 2008, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-
03/08/content_7746470.htm. See also Global Financial Crisis Spills over to China's Labor 
Market, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 2, 2008, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/ 
2008-11/02/content_7166354.htm; Vice Premier: Tap Consumption Potential to Sustain 
Growth, CHINA DAILY, Dec. 3, 2008, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/ 
bizchina/2008-12/03/content_7266480.htm. 
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prosperous with a world class financial industry, a prudent and conscientious 
government, financial regulators, and sophisticated consumers.82 There was a 
common perception in China that with regard to most financial and business matters, 
the United States was far ahead of China and that China had much to learn from the 
United States. As a result, China felt secure in building strong ties with the United 
States economy by investing heavily in manufacturing exports to the United States, 
purchasing U.S. government securities, and welcoming foreign direct investment 
from U.S. companies.83  
When the subprime mortgage problem triggered the global financial crisis, many 
in China believed that it was naïve and foolish to trust the United States; in 
retrospect, sectors of the financial industry in the United States seemed to be 
reckless, driven by greed and their own personal interests, and oblivious to the effect 
of their machinations on other countries and the global economy.84 China’s leaders 
were also shocked and surprised that the United States government seemed to have 
completely overlooked the problem and may have even contributed to it. The failure 
of the United States government to anticipate the subprime mortgage problem has 
also damaged the perception in China that the United States has highly skilled 
government and banking regulators.85 China has long viewed the United States with 
envy and admiration because the United States seemed to be an economic juggernaut 
that achieved vast amounts of wealth and was a leader as a modern and 
industrialized country.86 In contrast, China was a country in dire poverty only a few 
decades ago, and the United States was viewed from afar as a model to which China 
could aspire to within the limits of China’s vastly different political system and 
values. The subprime mortgage problem and the subsequent global financial crisis 
that it triggered has drastically altered this perception. There is now a sentiment in 
China that the United States is reckless, fallible, and driven by greed, and countries 
                                                          
 82 See Andrew Peaple, A Mixed Ending for Paulson in China, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 2008, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122846766539882535.html; China's Wen 
Guardedly Hopeful—But Premier Has Tough Words for U.S. Role in Financial Crisis, WASH. 
POST, Jan. 29, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2009/01/28/AR2009012803902.html (Wen offered lightly veiled criticism of the United States 
and Western financial institutions when he listed the causes of the financial crisis as “a ‘blind 
pursuit of profit’ and ‘a lack of self-discipline’ among financial institutions, [as well as] a 
failure of regulators to keep up with new financial instruments.”). 
 83 See MORRISON, TRADE ISSUES, supra note 51, at 8–10. See also Ian Bremmer, Gathering 
Storm: America and China in 2020, WORLD AFFAIRS, July/Aug. 2010, available at 
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2010-JulyAugust/full-Bremmer-JA-2010.html; 
Fang Cai, The Roles of Chinese Cconomists in Economic Reform 8 (The Australian Nat’l U. 
Asia Pac. Sch. Econ. & Mgmt., China Economy Papers 1998/2, 1998), available at 
http://dspace.anu.edu.au/bitstream/1885/40391/1/cep98-2.pdf. 
 84 See, e.g., MARK GILBERT, COMPLICIT: HOW GREED AND COLLUSION MADE THE CREDIT 
CRISIS UNSTOPPABLE 3, 41, 66–67 (2010). 
 85 See generally Bonnie S. Glaser & Lyle Morris, Chinese Perceptions of U.S. Decline and 
Power, 9 JAMESTOWN FOUND. 4 (2009); see also Fu Mengzi, Op-Ed., Old Order Should Yield 
Place to New, CHINA DAILY, May 18, 2009, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/ 
opinion/2009-05/18/content_7785807.htm. 
 86 David M. Finkelstein, China Reconsiders Its National Security: “The Great Peace and 
Development Debate of 1999,” PROJECT ASIA (CNA Corp., Alexandria, Va.,) Dec. 2000, at ii. 
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like China that create close economic ties with the United States put themselves at 
risk of suffering the consequences of the irresponsible behavior.87 China has long 
believed that the United States is far superior to China in business and financial 
matters; however, this belief has now been shaken in China, and many believe that 
China is now paying the price for having overestimated the business and financial 
prowess of the United States.88  
The consequences of the global financial crisis for China and its relationship with 
the United States are several. In China there is both a political and economic 
response. These responses, described below, trigger legal consequences.   
A.  Political Response 
One political response in China has been a call by hardliners for a rejection of 
economic reform and a return to China’s pre-reform centrally-controlled economy 
implemented by Mao after the establishment of the PRC in 1949.89 This position is 
extreme, and there is no realistic possibility that it will be implemented. However, 
some moderates have called for a slowing down of China’s market reforms and a 
more cautious and measured attitude; this is in contrast to the enthusiastic dedication 
to accelerate and deepen reforms of China’s economy to achieve a market-oriented 
economy, which appeared to be the position of the PRC government until the global 
financial crisis struck.90 An approach calling for slowdowns might have some 
political traction, but might also have a negative effect on China’s trading partners. 
China may restrict or limit access to its markets and various sectors of the economy 
to foreign direct investment and participation. This would have a negative impact on 
trade with the United States and other trading partners. 
Another, perhaps less obvious political response, might be a stronger 
nationalist/protectionist attitude on China’s part. A protectionist attitude seems to be 
already clearly manifested in China’s new indigenous innovation policy of its 
government procurement program,91 which calls for the government purchase92 of 
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technology that has been developed exclusively in China. Under this new policy, the 
PRC government will purchase technology (products or services that embody 
intellectual property) for its many public works projects only if the technology was 
developed exclusively in China. For example, if an MNC developed a patented 
product, such as a power generator, in the United States, the PRC would refuse to 
purchase the product. If some component of the product had been developed abroad 
but the product was the result of research and development in China, the PRC 
government would refuse to purchase the product under this new policy. Since 
government procurement in China (and in the United States) involves hundreds of 
billions of dollars in purchases every year, this new policy threatens to effectively 
foreclose the United States from a highly lucrative government procurement market 
since just about every product today involves technology. China’s economic 
stimulus package of $586 billion calls for the government purchase of products for 
China’s numerous public works projects, but the indigenous innovation policy might 
block the United States from any opportunities to sell its products to China. Since 
government procurement is not covered by the World Trade Organization, the 
United States would have no legal basis to contest China’s decision to block the 
purchase of foreign technology for its government projects.93 As a result, many U.S. 
companies are calling this policy unfair and harmful, although it is not illegal.94 The 
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Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994). Under GATT Article III, 
member states are prohibited from discriminating against imports in favor of domestically 
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Treatment Principle. However, GATT Article III:8(a) exempts government procurement from 
the National Treatment Principle. Id. As a result, member states are free to discriminate 
against foreign imports in government procurement. The WTO Agreement on Government 
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indigenous innovation policy is just one example, but there are many other 
government policies that are also viewed as favoring domestic Chinese industries 
over foreign competition. Of course, China can also use many subtle and ingenuous 
methods to discriminate against U.S. products and companies that are difficult to 
detect. 
A third political response may be a general hardening of attitudes towards the 
United States in trade and politics. Although China has long viewed the United 
States with admiration, it is an admiration that is mixed with fear and resentment. 
The United States has long attempted to take positions on China’s unresolved 
political issues that have irked PRC leaders. The most prominent example is the 
United States’ position on Taiwan, which China regards as a renegade province. At 
one time, the United States and Taiwan had a mutual defense treaty—that is, each 
party promised to come to the defense of the party if attacked.95 Of course, while this 
treaty was “mutual,” it was really a promise by the United States to protect Taiwan 
against a military strike by China. It should not be surprising that China viewed the 
mutual defense treaty, since abrogated,96 with a great deal of anger and resentment, 
as it was considered to be an intrusion into China’s own internal affairs and a direct 
and blatant threat to China’s sovereignty and national security. China continues to 
harbor a deep resentment against the United States on the Taiwan issue.97 For 
example, the United States continues to provide advanced weapons (such as world 
class fighter jets) to Taiwan over China’s vehement objections.98 In recent years, 
China has been further irked by the sympathetic position that many in the United 
States have taken towards Tibet, which China views as part of the motherland. It is 
difficult to underestimate the effect of these deep and bitter resentments on attitudes 
in China towards the United States because they are never too far from the surface. 
Many in China also believe that the United States uses its military and economic 
power to pressure and bully China on economic and political issues. In recent years, 
for example, the United States has taken to lecturing China on the need to protect 
U.S. intellectual property rights. Although Chinese officials sit morosely through 
these meetings and lectures, the perception is that the United States is arrogant and 
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condescending.99 Finally, many in China believe that the United States is 
intentionally and secretly attempting to frustrate and block China’s rise in the world 
because the United States does not wish to see another strong and prosperous 
country projecting its power and influence around the world as a challenger to the 
first class world power of the United States.100 While this sentiment may seem far 
fetched to some in the United States, China was subject to domination by foreign 
nations in the nineteenth and early twentieth century and suffered a brutal all-out 
invasion by Japan that was intended to completely subjugate and destroy the 
country.101 While no one in China believes that the United States has any military 
ambitions against China itself, the habit of mistrust of strong foreign powers is 
deeply ingrained in China. These simmering resentments, the eruption of the global 
financial crisis, and China’s increasing self-confidence coinciding with its own rise 
in the world as an economic power, create pressures on China’s leaders to stand up 
to the United States and to resist or reject U.S. pressure tactics. Hardliners in China 
might even call for retaliatory trade sanctions against the United States. If China 
takes this position on its currency and resists U.S. calls for devaluing its currency, 
trade tensions could escalate.102 
B.  Economic Response 
China’s elites believe that China might have been too dependent on an export-
driven economy and an economy dependent on FDI for growth. The downturn in 
exports and the influx of FDI have caused severe repercussions in China, thereby 
contributing to a significant rise in the shutting down of businesses and a spike in 
unemployment. China has adopted three steps designed to create economic growth 
through increases in domestic consumption that is intended, perhaps permanently or 
as part of an overall policy, to replace the loss of growth due to the decline in exports 
and FDI. 
1.  Fiscal Policy 
In November 2008, China tapped into its huge foreign currency reserves and 
introduced a $586 billion package. The package was designed to provide capital for 
domestic spending and to stimulate the economy by providing job creations and 
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public works with the goal of increasing GDP by 2 to 3 points.103 The following table 
presents a breakdown of the allocations under the stimulus package. 
 
TABLE 6 
CHINA’S DOMESTIC STIMULUS PACKAGE 
 
 
The economic stimulus package includes steps to assist China’s top pillar 
industries (those industries deemed essential to China’s national security, economic 
growth, and long-term competitiveness), such as automobiles, steel, shipbuilding, 
textiles, machinery, electronics and information technology, light industry (consumer 
products), petrochemicals, metals, and logistics.104 Among other steps, China is 
expected to provide subsidies to business entities in the form of tax cuts, tax rebates, 
and tax credits for exports, direct government grants, and capital funds for 
investment overseas.105 Many of these measures may be considered illegal subsidies 
by the United States and may create trade issues.106 
2.  Monetary Policy 
China’s stimulus package includes policies to loosen control on banks so they 
can lend more money. The PRC government will eliminate lending quotas and 
reduce interest rates so that banks are able to lend to companies and households.107 
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 105 See id. at 7. 
 106 For further discussion on illegal subsidies, see infra Part III.A. 
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Some of the loans will be at favorable rates to state-owned enterprises that export 
goods and services. Unlike the United States where banks are still unwilling to lend, 
China’s banks have responded almost immediately by lending to business enterprises 
and households.108 
3.  Social Programs 
China has substantially stepped up its social programs in health care, insurance, 
and pensions in its stimulus package. For example, on April 7, 2009, the PRC 
government announced plans to spend $124 billion over the next three years to 
create a universal health care system for all of its citizens.109 By 2011, the health care 
system should be in place and cover most of the population. The PRC government is 
also attempting to raise rural incomes and to narrow the gap between the incomes in 
rural and urban areas.110 For example, since February 2009, the PRC government has 
offered rebates of 13 percent to rural residents for the purchase of household 
appliances.111 Public housing projects, infrastructure projects, and plans to build 
schools and train teachers are all targeted in rural areas.112 The government has also 
promised to increase subsidies to farmers.113 
These social programs are designed to promote consumer spending to fuel the 
growth of the economy. To understand the importance of these reforms, it is 
necessary to note that the amount of precautionary savings in China is extremely 
high in comparison to other countries—about 30 percent to 40 percent in recent 
years.114 Precautionary savings occur when people believe that they need to provide 
for their own health care and retirement savings. If the PRC government is now 
providing these services, this will free up these savings for consumption that will 
help drive growth and productivity of the economy.  
III.  POTENTIAL TRADE U.S.-CHINA TRADE ISSUES AS A RESULT OF CHINA’S 
RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS  
By all accounts, China’s response to the global financial crisis has been effective, 
and China’s economy seems to be recovering on track.115 However, several aspects 
of China’s economic recovery plan may be viewed by some hardline constituencies 
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in the United States as further examples of unfair trade practices that require a 
retaliatory response. No doubt any action taken by the United States in response to 
China’s economic recovery program will be viewed with hostility, thereby 
prompting a harsh response in kind by China. In times of economic turmoil, nations 
tend to adopt policies and attitudes that are more nationalistic and protectionist than 
in times of economic prosperity. National governments are under pressure to protect 
domestic industries that may be suffering losses due to the economic turn. If the 
economic downturn is due to international trade, nations tend to blame each other for 
the causes of economic turmoil and are more likely to portray themselves as the 
aggrieved recipient of another nation’s imprudent fiscal and economic policies. A 
global economic downturn tends to create an atmosphere of mistrust and 
recrimination that may fuel an escalation in trade tensions between the United States 
and China which might otherwise not exist in a more stable economic environment. 
Such a tense atmosphere may even lead to the imposition of reciprocal trade 
sanctions between the two countries and a trade war that could damage the global 
economy.  
A.  Three Areas of Potential Concern 
The discussion below identifies several areas of concern that might lead to 
actions on the part of the United States, resulting in an escalation of trade tensions.  
1.  China’s Currency Policy 
One major point of contention between the two countries is China’s currency 
policy. Although China has allowed the RMB to appreciate, the exchange rate has 
mostly held steady for the past two years.116 Although China has allowed its currency 
to appreciate in the past five years, many critics argue that the pace of change is too 
slow and that more drastic measures may be in order. Many critics argue that China 
must allow its currency to appreciate at a much quicker pace by allowing the RMB 
to freely float and to have its exchange rate determined by market forces.117 This is a 
proposal that is unacceptable to China under present circumstances. The currency 
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issue could escalate into a trade war if the United States chooses to implement 
several options currently available under U.S. federal law to pressure China to 
change its currency policy more swiftly.  
Under Section 3004 of the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act,118 the 
Secretary of the Treasury is required to issue a report every six months on 
international economic policy and to identify any countries that are manipulating 
their currencies in order to obtain an unfair trade advantage. After China reformed its 
currency policy in 2005 to allow a managed float, then-President George Bush 
declined to cite China for currency manipulation.119 In 2009, the Secretary of the 
Treasury issued a report that indicated that China’s currency remained undervalued 
but declined to cite China as a currency manipulator.120 If the trade deficit continues 
to grow and China does not make major changes in its current policy, pressure from 
Congress may amount to a point where the current President would have to declare 
China as a currency manipulator and impose trade sanctions as outlined in the 1988 
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act.121 
Some bills have been proposed by Congress (i.e., H.R. 2378 and S. 1027) that 
would make currency manipulation by some countries actionable under U.S. 
countervailing duty laws. The basic rationale of these bills is as follows: by 
artificially keeping the value of the RMB low and by preventing the RMB from 
appreciating against the dollar, China is able to sell its goods at artificially low prices 
in the United States. An undervalued currency creates the equivalent of an export 
subsidy for China’s goods because these goods are being sold at prices that are less 
than the prices determined solely by market forces. These export subsidies should be 
offset by the imposition of a countervailing duty that, in turn, offsets the benefit of 
the subsidy.122 For example, if China’s currency is undervalued by 40% as some 
claim, then the price of an export to the United States is 40% less than what it should 
be under a system allowing for a free and fair exchange rate. Thus, the remedy 
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would be to impose a tariff of 40% on imports from China to offset or countervail 
the effects of China’s currency manipulation.123 
2.  Countervailing Duties on Subsidized Exports 
As described in Part II.B(1), a major component of China’s economic stimulus 
package is to provide financial assistance to key industries that are necessary for 
China’s economic development and recovery. Some of these financial payments are 
export subsidies, i.e., payments provided to industries (such as steel and textiles, two 
important exports to the United States) that export their products to the United States 
at prices lower than would otherwise be available without the benefit of the 
subsidy.124 Some in Congress have called for the imposition of countervailing duties 
to offset the effect of these export subsidies.125 Legislation has been introduced (i.e., 
H.R. 496 and H.R. 499) to ensure that countervailing duty laws continue to be 
applied to imports of goods from China that benefit from export subsidies.126 It is 
also possible that the United States will also impose anti-dumping duties on the same 
subsidized products imported from China.127 Anti-dumping duties are imposed when 
                                                          
 123 U.S. laws imposing countervailing duties must be consistent with the World Trade 
Organization Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (1994), see Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14; Final Act 
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multicultural Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 
1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125; Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 1A, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1154. China can challenge an attempt by the United 
States to impose countervailing duties on subsidies created by currency manipulation within 
the WTO through the WTO’s dispute settlement procedure. However, such a challenge could 
take months, if not years, after the damage to China’s export industries and China’s economic 
recovery has already occurred. See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, 
supra note 7, at 737. 
 124 See Challenges and Choices to Apply Countervailing Duties to China: Hearing Before 
the U.S.-China Econ. and Sec. Rev. Comm’n, 108th Cong. 1 (2006) (statement of Loren 
Yager, Director, International Affairs and Trade). 
 125 Countervailing duties are governed by Section 701 of the Tariff Act of 1930, see Tariff 
Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671–1671(h) (2009). These provisions implement and are subject 
to the disciplines of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
Agreement, see Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 
U.N.T.S. 14; Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multicultural Trade 
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125; Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1154 [hereinafter Marrakesh 
Agreement]. 
 126 Trade Enforcement Act of 2009, H.R. 496, 111th Cong. § 201 (2009); Nonmarket 
Economy Trade Remedy Act of 2009, H.R. 499, 111th Cong. § 2(f) (2009). The text and 
current status of both bills can be viewed on the Library of Congress webpages which are 
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c111:H.R.496.IH: and http://thomas.loc. 
gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c111:H.R.499.IH:. See also Scott D. McBride, Something Wicked This 
Way Comes: The United States Government's Response to Unsafe Imported Chinese Toys and 
Subsidized Chinese Exports, 45 TEX. INT'L L. J. 233, 275–93 (2009). 
 127 Anti-dumping duties are governed by Section 731 et seq. of the Tariff Act of 1930, see 
Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673–1673(i) (2009). These provisions implement and are 
subject to the disciplines of the WTO Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (the Anti-Dumping Agreement), see Anti-
dumping (Article VI of GATT 1994), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
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an import is traded at an unfairly low price, which is defined as a lower price than 
the home market of the exporter. The remedy is to impose an additional tariff that 
offsets the margin of dumping. In some cases, a product can be subject to both 
countervailing duties and anti-dumping duties at the same time.128 
3.  Safeguards 
Under its Protocol of Accession to the World Trade Organization,129 China 
agreed to allow the United States to impose safeguards on products from China for a 
period of 12 years starting from the date of China’s accession to the WTO in 2001. 
Safeguards are considered to be emergency measures that can be imposed by the 
United States (in the form of quotas and increased tariffs) on imports from other 
countries to alleviate the harm that can be caused by a sudden surge of imports that 
cause or threaten to cause material injury to U.S. industries.130 China was not very 
skillful in drafting its Protocol of Accession since it allows the United States to 
target only products from China for safeguard remedies. Under the WTO, safeguards 
must be imposed on all products causing harm, without discrimination, as to their 
country of origin; under WTO law, it would not be possible to single out one country 
for the imposition of safeguards while ignoring similar imports from other 
countries.131 However, the China safeguard provision allows the United States to 
                                                          
World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 
I.L.M. 1125 (1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/19-adp_01_e. 
htm; see also Marrakesh Agreement supra note 125. 
 128 Suppose, for example, that Country A provides export subsidies to a company that 
manufactures the products both for export as well as for domestic consumption in Country A. 
Suppose that that the company sells the product in Country A at a price that is lower by more 
than a de minimis amount than the company charges in its export market, the United States. 
Under U.S. law, it would be possible to impose a countervailing duty to offset the effect of the 
subsidy and an anti-dumping duty equal to the margin of dumping, i.e. the difference between 
the home market price and the export price (i.e., the U.S. price). Although it is possible to 
initiate parallel anti-dumping and subsidies investigations against the same imports, such 
parallel investigations are rare. The burden of defending an anti-dumping or subsidies 
investigation alone is usually so onerous on the exporter that initiating one type of 
investigation often accomplishes the goal of the petitioning U.S. industry of pressuring the 
exporter into a settlement. See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra 
note 7, at 640.  
 129 China’s Protocol sets forth the terms and conditions of China’s entry into the WTO,  see 
Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China Part I.16, Charter of the U.N. 
Art, 102 (Nov. 10, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/complete 
acc_e.htm. 
 130 Safeguards are governed by Sections 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, see Trade Act of 
1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (2009). These provisions implement Article IX of the GATT, the 
escape clause, and the WTO Safeguards Agreement into federal law. Unlike anti-dumping 
duties and countervailing duties, which are remedies for unfair trade practices, safeguards may 
be imposed, even without the involvement of unfair trade, to avoid harm to domestic 
industries caused by a sudden and unexpected surge in imports. For a detailed discussion of 
safeguards under WTO and U.S. law, see CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
LAW, supra note 7, at 539–47. 
 131 See Agreement on Safeguards, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex IA, Arts. 2.1, 2.2; see also CHOW 
& SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 7, at 571–81. 
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discriminate against imports solely from China. Some industry groups in the United 
States must pressure Congress to invoke safeguards against China. In particular, the 
textile and apparel industries in the United States are concerned about imports of 
textiles from China. In 2008, China was the largest supplier of textiles to the United 
States at $32.7 billion, or 35.1%.132 From 2002 to 2008, China’s exports of textiles to 
the United States rose by 274%.133 The textile industry, and many other industries 
affected by imports from China, may put additional pressure on the U.S. government 
for trade sanctions against China under the special safeguards provision in China’s 
Protocol of Accession.134   
B.  China’s Perspective on Prospective Measures Taken by the United States 
No nation wishes to be the recipient of economic sanctions imposed by the 
United States, but there are several elements in the current United States-China 
economic relationship that are likely to exacerbate the intensity of the negative 
reaction from China. As noted earlier, China feels that, to some extent, it has been 
naïve and foolish in establishing such a strong dependence on the U.S. economy. 
China now believes that this dependence has been costly because the economic 
downturn in the United States has created serious repercussions in China. In 
addition, China places much of the blame for precipitating the global financial crisis 
on the United States because the U.S. financial industry created the subprime 
mortgage problem. In other words, China believes that it (and the rest of the world) 
has been harmed by a financial crisis that is largely the doing of the United States.  
China is in a better position than many other countries to withstand the global 
financial crisis: its conservative and prudent fiscal policies placed an emphasis on 
saving and investing its earnings, rather than on consumption. This has allowed 
China to have the resources at hand to finance and implement a $586 billion 
economic stimulus package. However, China now finds that its economic stimulus 
package, designed to alleviate the effects of the global financial crisis, might come 
under challenge by the United States and might be the subject of trade sanctions 
imposed by the United States. In order words, the United States might seek to 
undermine and punish China for an economic recovery package that is designed to 
address the very economic problems caused by the United States in triggering the 
global financial crisis. Moreover, China’s economic recovery package is designed to 
address a fundamental imbalance in China’s economy: an overdependence of exports 
and FDI. The package is designed as part of a shift to a model of economic growth 
that creates an important role for domestic consumption as a driver of growth and 
will further create a sustainable economic model for the foreseeable future. A set of 
U.S.-imposed trade sanctions might be viewed by China as an effort to derail this 
fundamental realignment of China’s economy. 
At this point, if the United States places additional pressure on China to allow its 
currency to float, China’s export industries may be further harmed. As these 
                                                          
 132 See MORRISON, TRADE ISSUES, supra note 51, at 24. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Letter from Tracy Mullin, President & CEO, National Retail Federation, to President 
Barack Obama, Trade Policy, The White House (Mar. 26, 2009) (on file with National Retail 
Federation), available at http://www.nrf.com/modules.php?name=Documents&op=viewlive& 
sp_id=2777. 
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industries are now beginning to recover, a significant appreciation in China’s 
currency will result in another slowing down of exports and may result in further 
layoffs and closings. In addition, China’s economic stimulus package is designed to 
bolster key industries essential to China’s long term economic development. These 
industries have received large government grants or subsidies. Some of these 
industries will export their products to the United States. If the United States 
imposes (as threatened) increased tariffs in the form of countervailing duties to offset 
the subsidies, the effect of China’s economic stimulus package will be neutralized by 
the trade sanctions imposed by the United States. Of course, China’s economic 
stimulus package is comprehensive and the support of export industries is just one 
element of the package, but it is an important element and attempts by the United 
States to punish China by imposing countervailing duties for its domestic subsidies 
or for an undervalued currency is sure to provoke a hostile reaction from China.  
The hardliners among China’s elites may put pressure on China to stand up to the 
United States. A common view in China is that the United States caused the global 
financial crisis and now has the temerity to punish China for attempting to redress 
the very problem that it caused. Some hardliners in China might even see an 
intentional attempt on the part of the United States to frustrate China’s economic 
development and to prevent China from developing into a first tier economic power. 
Under these current political conditions, it is possible that any trade sanctions 
imposed by the United States might trigger equivalent reciprocal sanctions from 
China—that is, China might increase tariffs on imports from the United States in an 
escalating tit-for-tat. Such tactics would have a negative and adverse affect on trade 
between the two countries, with repercussions for the global economy as a whole. 
China may also react to increased trade pressures from the United States by 
taking other actions that might damage U.S. interests. Some reports indicate that 
PRC authorities have already agreed to ease enforcement against counterfeiters and 
other pirates of intellectual property rights on the grounds that commercial piracy, 
while illegal, provides employment opportunities and economic benefits for local 
economies.135 China may also permit the exponential growth in the export of 
counterfeit and pirated goods to continue unabatedly because these exports, while 
illegal, nevertheless help China’s trade balance and also provide jobs for its millions 
of otherwise unemployed workers.136 Some in China might view a policy of 
tolerating counterfeiting and other forms of commercial piracy as a justified response 
to bullying by the United States.  
On a broader policy front, China may believe that it has become overly 
dependent on the United States and that it needs to find alternative markets and 
trading partners. China has for some time begun to strengthen its trading 
relationships with other countries in Asia through the development of free trade 
                                                          
 135 See generally Daniel Chow, Counterfeiting in the People’s Republic of China, 78 
WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (2000). 
 136 See CHINA'S FOREIGN TRADE POLICY: THE NEW CONSTITUENCIES 67 (Ka Zeng, ed. 
2009); Daniel Chow, Organized Crime, Local Protectionism, and the Trade in Counterfeit 
Goods in China, 14 CHINA ECON. REV. 473, 481 (2003). See also Intellectual Property Rights 
Issues and Imported Counterfeit Goods: Hearing Before the U.S.-China Econ. And Security 
Review Comm., 109th Cong. (June 7–8, 2006) (prepared statement of Daniel Chow, Professor 
of Law, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law), at p. 214–15. 
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agreements (FTAs), which eliminate most or all tariffs between trading partners.137 
FTAs create trade among its members but also divert trade from non-members. 
These FTAs may have a negative impact on U.S.-China trade. If, for example, goods 
from Japan can enter China subject to zero tariffs, then U.S. imports, which are 
subject to normal tariffs, may be displaced by Japanese goods. China is leading 
efforts to create free trade areas in Asia and may even eventually help to create a 
Pan-Asia free trade area.138 China may also seek to establish an Asian Monetary 
Fund, one that can compete with the International Monetary Fund139 in providing 
loans to developing countries. A leading role in the Asian Monetary Fund could 
bolster China’s influence with developing countries and allow China to compete 
with the Untied States for the allegiance of these countries by making “no strings 
attached” loans.140 
Finally, China may use the global financial crisis to strengthen its economic 
relationships with certain countries—i.e., Sudan, Nigeria, and Iran—regarded as 
rogue states in order to meet China’s seemingly insatiable energy needs.141 Of 
course, China has already established relationships with such states, but additional 
unwanted pressure from the United States to reform its currency policy and to 
remove subsidies from important state-owned enterprises might push China into 
further expanding and deepening these relationships, both to serve its own needs but 
also to send a signal to the United States that its pressure tactics may have long-term 
negative repercussions for United States’ foreign policy and global interests.  
                                                          
 137 See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 7, at 90–94. 
 138 Liz Gooch, Asia Free-Trade Zone Raises Hopes, and Some Fears About China, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 1, 2010, at B3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/01/business/global/ 
01trade.html; Fred Thurlow, All Trade Roads Lead to China, ASIA TIMES, Nov. 8, 2001, 
available at http://atimes.com/china/CK08Ad01.html. 
 139 The International Monetary Fund was established after the end of the Second World 
War to help avoid the disastrous protectionist monetary policies that contributed to the war. 
The IMF was designed to help stabilize exchange rates to avoid the unilateral devaluation of 
currencies by nations and to lend money to nations to help with their balance of payment 
obligations (i.e., the obligation to pay monetary obligations, such as loans in foreign 
currency). If Country A took a loan from Country B or Country A purchased goods from 
Country B, then Country A would need to pay Country B in foreign currency. Country A may 
not have enough foreign currency on hand due to financial mismanagement or an unexpected 
downturn in its economy. The IMF can provide a loan to Country A to allow it to meet its 
repayment obligations.  
 140 The IMF, located in Washington, D.C., is often viewed as under the heavy influence of 
the United States: the United States is the largest contributor of funds to the IMF and the 
president of the IMF has traditionally always been American. The IMF often places conditions 
on its loans. Countries usually have to agree to a certain set of fiscal policies and the IMF 
imposes measures designed to prevent government corruption. China has begun to compete 
with the IMF in making loans to developing countries, but China’s loans come with no 
conditions, which make them very popular with the recipient countries. See Jane Perlez, China 
Competes with West in Aid to its Neighbors, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2006, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/18/world/asia/18iht-web.0918aid.2845121.html. 
 141 See Paul J. Smith, China’s Economic and Political Rise: Implications for Global 
Terrorism and U.S.–China Cooperation, 32 STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 627, 632–33 
(2009). 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
With its lack of exposure to subprime mortgage assets and its substantial foreign 
currency reserves, China has been able to withstand the impact of the global 
financial crisis better than many countries. The impact of the global financial crisis 
on China has been the decline in demand for its exports from other countries affected 
by the crisis and a decrease in the influx of foreign capital. China’s reform package 
is designed to deal with these problems by bolstering exports in the short-term to 
stem losses in employment and the closing of factories, and by rebalancing its 
economy in the long-term so that it is not overly dependent on exports and FDI for 
growth. Pressure tactics by the United States that call for immediate changes in 
China’s internal policies might be viewed with hostility in China and might even be 
viewed as an intentional attempt to undermine China’s economic recovery. While 
China will never find the threat of trade sanctions from the United States to be a 
pleasant prospect, the unstable and still precarious economic conditions in China 
suggest that the reaction from China could be especially severe and hostile. Despite 
this prospect, hardliners in the United States are calling for harsh measures, such as 
treating China’s currency as a subsidy subject to countervailing duties. If the 
hardliners from both countries have their way, trade sanctions imposed by the United 
States might draw retaliatory trade sanctions from China, creating an unfortunate tit-
for-tat that might escalate into a trade war. A moderate position on both sides would 
be based on dialogue without mutual threats and recriminations. Such a moderate 
position would further seek gradual changes in China’s current economic policies 
(already resulting in progress in recent years). Moderate calls for further gradual 
reform might resolve some of these trade issues without escalating trade tensions 
between the two countries.  
 
